đš Critical Cyber Threat: Russian GRU APT28 Targets Western Logistics Infrastructure
A comprehensive analysis of the latest international cybersecurity advisory revealing Russian state-sponsored attacks against Western supply chains supporting Ukraine.
đŻ Executive Summary
In a joint cybersecurity advisory released by multiple international intelligence agencies, we're witnessing an unprecedented escalation in Russian military intelligence (GRU) cyber operations. The threat actor known as APT28, Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, and BlueDelta has been systematically targeting Western logistics entities and technology companies that coordinate aid shipments to Ukraine.
â ïž Key Threat Indicators
- Primary Targets: Logistics companies, transportation hubs, maritime operations
- Geographic Scope: 13 countries including US, Germany, Poland, France
- Attack Vectors: Spearphishing, credential stuffing, CVE exploitation
- Advanced Tactics: Custom malware, IP camera surveillance, email collection
đ Global Impact and Targeted Sectors
Countries Under Attack
The following nations have confirmed targeted entities:
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, United States
âïž Advanced Attack Techniques
Campaign Timeline
.png)
.png)
Initial Access Methods
- Credential Guessing/Brute Force - Systematic password attacks
- Spearphishing Campaigns - Targeted emails with malicious links/attachments
- CVE Exploitation - Outlook NTLM (CVE-2023-23397), WinRAR (CVE-2023-38831)
- VPN Exploitation - Compromising corporate VPN infrastructure
Post-Compromise Operations
- Active Directory Compromise - Dumping NTDS.dit databases
- Email Collection - Sustained access to organizational communications
- Lateral Movement - Using Impacket tools and PsExec
- Data Exfiltration - Stealing sensitive shipment information
đ”ïž Malware Arsenal Analysis
HEADLACE
A sophisticated backdoor that uses malicious shortcuts and credential phishing to establish persistence.
MASEPIE
Python-based malware for remote command execution and file manipulation.
STEELHOOK
PowerShell script designed to steal browser credentials from Chrome and Edge.
Custom NTLM Listener
Specialized tool for capturing and relaying NTLM authentication credentials.
đč IP Camera Surveillance Operations
One of the most concerning aspects of this campaign is the targeting of IP cameras at border crossings and military installations. The attackers have:
- Targeted over 10,000 IP cameras primarily in Ukraine and bordering countries
- Focused 81% of efforts on Ukrainian cameras
- Used RTSP protocol to access camera feeds
- Monitored aid shipment movements in real-time
đĄïž Azure Sentinel Detection Rules
Below are custom KQL queries to detect APT28 activities in your environment:
1. Brute Force IP Detection
// Detection for GRU Unit 26165 Brute Force IP Addresses
let BruteForceIPs = dynamic([
"192.162.174.94", "207.244.71.84", "31.135.199.145", "79.184.25.198", "91.149.253.204",
"103.97.203.29", "162.210.194.2", "31.42.4.138", "79.185.5.142", "91.149.254.75",
"209.14.71.127", "46.112.70.252", "83.10.46.174", "91.149.255.122",
"109.95.151.207", "46.248.185.236", "83.168.66.145", "91.149.255.19",
"64.176.67.117", "83.168.78.27", "91.149.255.195",
"64.176.69.196", "83.168.78.31", "91.221.88.76",
"70.34.242.220", "89.64.70.69", "147.135.209.245"
]);
union SecurityEvent, SigninLogs, CommonSecurityLog, DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where (IpAddress in (BruteForceIPs)) or
(ClientIP in (BruteForceIPs)) or
(SourceIP in (BruteForceIPs)) or
(RemoteIP in (BruteForceIPs))
| extend ThreatIndicator = "GRU Unit 26165 Brute Force Infrastructure"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IpAddress, ClientIP, SourceIP, RemoteIP, Activity, ThreatIndicator
2. Malicious Email Detection (CVE-2023-23397)
// Detection for CVE-2023-23397 Exploitation IOCs
let MaliciousEmails = dynamic([
"md-shoeb@alfathdoor.com.sa", "jayam@wizzsolutions.com", "accounts@regencyservice.in",
"m.salim@tsc-me.com", "vikram.anand@4ginfosource.com", "mdelafuente@ukwwfze.com",
"sarah@cosmicgold469.co.za", "franch1.lanka@bplanka.com", "commerical@vanadrink.com",
"maint@goldenloaduae.com", "karina@bhpcapital.com", "tv@coastalareabank.com",
"ashoke.kumar@hbclife.in"
]);
EmailEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where SenderFromAddress in (MaliciousEmails) or
SenderMailFromAddress in (MaliciousEmails) or
RecipientEmailAddress in (MaliciousEmails)
| extend ThreatIndicator = "CVE-2023-23397 Exploitation Attempt"
| project TimeGenerated, SenderFromAddress, SenderMailFromAddress, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, AttachmentCount, ThreatIndicator
3. Suspicious Archive Detection (CVE-2023-38831)
// Detection for Malicious Archive Filenames (CVE-2023-38831)
let MaliciousArchives = dynamic([
"calc.war.zip", "news_week_6.zip", "Roadmap.zip",
"SEDE-PV-2023-10-09-1_EN.zip", "war.zip", "Zeyilname.zip"
]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName in (MaliciousArchives) or
FolderPath contains "calc.war.zip" or
FolderPath contains "news_week_6.zip" or
FolderPath contains "war.zip"
| extend ThreatIndicator = "CVE-2023-38831 Malicious Archive"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ThreatIndicator
4. Suspicious Command Line Detection
// Detection for Suspicious Command Lines Used by APT28
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "ntdsutil.exe \"activate instance ntds\" ifm \"create full C:\\temp\\" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "edge.exe \"-headless-new -disable-gpu\"" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "ssh -Nf" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks /create /xml"
| extend ThreatIndicator = "APT28 Suspicious Command Line"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, ThreatIndicator
đŠ Malware-Specific Detection Rules
HEADLACE Malware Detection
// HEADLACE Malware Detection
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName endswith ".lnk"
| join kind=inner (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "msedge.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "--headless=new"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "--disable-gpu"
) on DeviceId
| extend ThreatIndicator = "HEADLACE Malware Activity"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, ThreatIndicator
// HEADLACE Credential Phishing Detection
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "Get-Credential" and
ProcessCommandLine contains "whoami" and
ProcessCommandLine contains "while($true)"
| extend ThreatIndicator = "HEADLACE Credential Phishing"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ThreatIndicator
MASEPIE Python Script Detection
// MASEPIE Python Script Detection
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName endswith ".py"
| join kind=inner (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "os.popen('whoami').read()" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "elif message == 'check'" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "elif message == 'send_file':" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "Bad command!'.encode('ascii'"
) on DeviceId
| extend ThreatIndicator = "MASEPIE Malware"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, ThreatIndicator
STEELHOOK Browser Credential Theft
// STEELHOOK PowerShell Script Detection
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "LOCALAPPDATA\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Local State" and
ProcessCommandLine contains "LOCALAPPDATA\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Local State" and
(ProcessCommandLine contains "os_crypt.encrypted_key" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope")
| extend ThreatIndicator = "STEELHOOK Browser Credential Theft"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ThreatIndicator
PSEXEC Lateral Movement Detection
// PSEXEC Usage Detection
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName =~ "psexec.exe" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "PSEXESVC" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "/accepteula" or
ProcessCommandLine contains "\\\\.*\\ADMIN$"
| extend ThreatIndicator = "PSEXEC Lateral Movement"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ThreatIndicator
Custom NTLM Listener Detection
// NTLM Listener Detection
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "New-Object System.Net.HttpListener" and
ProcessCommandLine contains "Prefixes.Add('http://localhost:8080/')" and
ProcessCommandLine contains "Authorization"
| extend ThreatIndicator = "APT28 Custom NTLM Listener"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ThreatIndicator
đ TTP Glossary: Understanding the Attack Techniques
đȘ Initial Access Techniques
- T1199 - Trusted Relationship: Exploiting business partnerships to gain access to additional targets
- T1566 - Phishing: Sending deceptive emails to steal credentials or deliver malware
- T1133 - External Remote Services: Compromising VPNs and external-facing services
- T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application: Using known vulnerabilities in public services
⥠Execution Techniques
- T1204.001 - User Execution: Malicious Link: Tricking users into clicking dangerous shortcuts
- T1204.002 - User Execution: Malicious File: Getting users to run malicious executables
- T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Using system tools like PowerShell and Python
đ Persistence Techniques
- T1098.002 - Account Manipulation: Modifying email permissions for continued access
- T1556.006 - Modify Authentication Process: Enrolling compromised accounts in MFA
- T1547.001 - Registry Run Keys: Using Windows registry for automatic startup
- T1053.005 - Scheduled Task: Creating system tasks for persistence
đĄïž Defense Evasion
- T1070.001 - Indicator Removal: Deleting Windows logs to hide activity
- T1574.001 - DLL Search Order Hijacking: Exploiting Windows DLL loading
đ Credential Access
- T1110.001 - Brute Force: Password Guessing: Systematic password attacks
- T1110.003 - Brute Force: Password Spraying: Using common passwords across accounts
- T1187 - Forced Authentication: Exploiting Outlook vulnerability to capture credentials
- T1003.003 - OS Credential Dumping: Extracting password databases
đš Immediate Action Items for Organizations
Critical Patches Required
- CVE-2023-23397: Outlook NTLM vulnerability
- CVE-2023-38831: WinRAR vulnerability
- CVE-2021-44026, CVE-2020-35730, CVE-2020-12641: Roundcube vulnerabilities
đĄïž Enhanced Security Measures
- Implement Zero Trust Architecture
- Network segmentation
- Device-based access controls
- Continuous authentication verification
- Deploy Advanced Detection
- EDR solutions on all critical systems
- SIEM integration with threat intelligence
- Custom detection rules (provided above)
- Strengthen Authentication
- Multi-factor authentication with hardware tokens
- Disable NTLM authentication where possible
- Regular credential rotation
- IP Camera Security
- Change default credentials
- Disable unnecessary network features (UPnP, P2P)
- Implement network segmentation
- Regular firmware updates
đ Global Implications
This campaign represents more than just another cyberattackâit's a strategic intelligence operation with potential physical world consequences. The targeting of logistics infrastructure supporting Ukraine aid demonstrates how cyber operations are being used to support kinetic military objectives.
Key concerns include:
- Supply chain disruption capabilities
- Intelligence gathering on Western aid shipments
- Potential for escalation to destructive attacks
- Precedent for targeting civilian logistics infrastructure
đź Looking Forward
Organizations in the logistics, transportation, and critical infrastructure sectors must treat this as a national security imperative. The sophistication and persistence of this campaign suggest that APT28 will continue evolving their tactics.
Recommended next steps:
- Implement the detection rules provided in this analysis
- Conduct threat hunting exercises using the IOCs
- Review and update incident response procedures
- Engage with industry information sharing organizations
- Consider cyber insurance coverage evaluation
đĄ Stay Informed
This threat landscape is rapidly evolving. For the latest updates on APT28 activities and additional detection rules, follow the joint advisories from international cybersecurity agencies and implement continuous threat intelligence monitoring.
This analysis is based on the joint cybersecurity advisory released by multiple international intelligence agencies in May 2025. Organizations should validate these indicators in their own environments and adapt detection rules to their specific infrastructure.
Tags: #CyberSecurity #APT28 #ThreatIntelligence #AzureSentinel #KQL #RussianHackers #LogisticsSecurity #CriticalInfrastructure
